With more than 500 million daily tweets from over 330 million active users, Twi er constantly a racts malicious users aiming to carry out phishing and malware-related a acks against its user base. It therefore becomes of paramount importance to assess the e ectiveness of Twi er's use of blacklists in protecting its users from such threats. We collected more than 182 million public tweets containing URLs from Twi er's Stream API over a 2-month period and compared these URLs against 3 popular phishing, social engineering, and malware blacklists, including Google Safe Browsing (GSB). We focus on the delay period between an a ack URL rst being tweeted to appearing on a blacklist, as this is the timeframe in which blacklists do not warn users, leaving them vulnerable. Experiments show that, whilst GSB is e ective at blocking a number of social engineering and malicious URLs within 6 hours of being tweeted, a signi cant number of URLs go undetected for at least 20 days. For instance, during one month, we discovered 4,930 tweets containing URLs leading to social engineering websites that had been tweeted to over 131 million Twi er users. We also discovered 1,126 tweets containing 376 blacklisted Bitly URLs that had a combined total of 991,012 clicks, posing serious security and privacy threats. In addition, an equally large number of URLs contained within public tweets remain in GSB for at least 150 days, raising questions about potential false positives in the blacklist. We also provide evidence to suggest that Twi er may no longer be using GSB to protect its users.
INTRODUCTION
Since its creation in 2006, Twi er has gained over 974 million users with 330 million active users per month posting 500 million tweets per day [2] . Among these Twi er users are many high pro le celebrities, politicians, heads of state and societal in uencers whom a ract large numbers of followers [39] . Due to this large user base, Twi er makes an a ractive target for malicious users aiming to carry out phishing and malware a acks to exploit people. One of the main ways these a acks are carried out is by leading victims to a malicious site, by including one or more URLs in a tweet, whereby the a ack can occur.
Phishing a acks on Twi er have been known to lure victims in by o ering veri cation on the social network but instead take them to a fake login page to steal their Twi er username and password [4] , while malware a acks have included drive-by-download links contained within tweets, cross-site scripting a acks [1] , and Android malware that is controlled by tweets [9] .
Twi er has come under increasing pressure to protect its users against these a acks, such as, in 2010 when the company se led a case with the US Federal Trade Commission in which Twi er agreed to strengthen security throughout the platform and to carry out an independently assessed bi-annual information security audit [11] .
One of the ways in which Twi er is improving its security for users is by implementing numerous rules that govern what type of content users of the platform can and cannot send [38] . In 2009, it was reported [24] that Twi er had started to use the phishing and malware blacklist Google Safe Browsing (GSB), already used by popular web browsers to lter out and protect its users from a ack URLs. We provide evidence that suggests Twi er is not using GSB e ectively to protect its users.
Our paper aims to assess how e ective Twi er's use of blacklists is in protecting its users from phishing and malware a acks. In particular, we focus on the delay period between an a ack URL rst being tweeted to appearing in one of 3 de ned blacklists, as this is the timeframe in which blacklists do not warn users against the a ack. We collected over 182 million public tweets containing URLs from Twi er's Stream API over a 2-month period and compared these URLs against 3 popular phishing, social engineering, and malware blacklists that are used in leading web browsers, antivirus solutions, and other online protection technologies.
During one month we discovered 4,930 tweets containing URLs leading to social engineering websites that had been tweeted to over 131 million Twi er users. e majority of URLs contained within these tweets took between 20 and 30 days to appear in GSB. We focus on GSB because it is the main protection used in popular web browsers. In the same month we also discovered 1,126 tweets containing 376 blacklisted Bitly URLs that had a combined total of 991,012 clicks -these Bitly URLs represent 11% of the total blacklisted social engineering URLs in our dataset for that month.
is demonstrates that Twi er users are clicking on and being exposed to dangerous websites.
We also discovered that, while the GSB blacklist is e ective at blocking a large number of social engineering and malicious URLs within 6 hours of being tweeted, a large number of URLs go undetected for at least 20 days, with users potentially exposed to a acks during this delay. In addition, an equally large number of URLs contained within public tweets remained in the GSB blacklist for at least 150 days, potentially raising issues with false positives in the blacklist.
Twi er provides a Stream API to access a source of live tweets. ere are 3 ways of accessing this API: the lter/sample, decahose, and rehose streams. ese feeds contain, approximately, 1%, 10%, and 100% of all public tweets, respectively. e lter/sample feed is free to access, while the decahose and rehose feeds come at a substantial cost. Our study made use of Twi er's lter/sample stream. ere are methodological limitations to using this smaller sample feed. For example, URLs of interest may not be contained in the feed we receive. We compensate as much as possible for this, with techniques such as using Twi er's Search API to determine original tweet date instead of relying entirely on what our 1% sample tells us.
To the best of our knowledge ours is the rst in-depth study that speci cally focuses on the impact of blacklist delays on Twi er tra c. Our study provides a present-day snapshot of the current state of phishing and malware URLs being posted to Twi er. A previous study from 2010 [15] took important rst steps in this direction, but Twi er's active user base has grown from 30 million users in 2010 to 330 million users in 2017 [35] and the number of daily tweets has grown from 35 million in 2010 to over 500 million in 2017 [16] . We replicate the experiment of [15] (to the extent we can in the face of missing details in [15] ) but also present a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of malicious URLs on Twi er. In particular, we introduce a new methodology to measure delay from rst tweet to membership in the GSB blacklist to determine e ectiveness of Twi er URL blacklists. We are also able to determine worst-case scenario delay periods, and we measure the duration of time that URLs stay in GSB.
We organise the remainder of this paper into the following sections: Section 2 introduces the background and related work, Section 3 describes the design and infrastructure we used to carry out experiments and the experiments themselves, Section 4 describes how we implemented the infrastructure and experiments, Section 5 presents our results, Section 6 discusses the main ndings, and Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 2.1 Blacklists
A blacklist is de ned as a set of elements to be blocked; an access control list. Our study looks at phishing and malware blacklists that are used to block access to URLs posted to Twi er. We focus on 3 blacklists: Google Safe Browsing [13] , Open Phish [25] , and Phish Tank [29] .
Google Safe Browsing: Google Safe Browsing (GSB) is a URL blacklist that contains both malicious and phishing URLs and is used by the web browsers Google Chrome, Safari, Firefox, Opera, and Vivaldi to protect users from dangerous websites. We focus on GSB in our study because of its prominence in popular web browsers: already in 2012 GSB was protecting 600 million users from dangerous websites [41] . In 2015 GSB began using the term "Social Engineering" to categorise phishing websites which also encompass additional types of deceptive content. Google de nes a social engineering web a ack as occurring when either: "the content pretends to act, or looks and feels, like a trusted entity -like a bank or government" or "the content tries to trick you into doing something you would only do for a trusted entity -like sharing a password or calling tech support" [12] . During the week commencing 3rd September 2017 the total number of sites deemed dangerous by GSB was 573,433 phishing and 500,245 malicious. During that week GSB detected 24,756 new phishing sites and 6,312 new malware sites. GSB de nes malware websites in its blacklist as being either compromised or a ack. A compromised website is a legitimate website that has been hijacked to either include, or direct users to, malicious content. An a ack site is a website that has intentionally been set up to host and distribute malware [14] . During the week commencing 3rd September 2017, GSB identi ed 5,981 new compromised websites and 335 new a ack websites.
GSB provides two APIs for accessing its blacklist: Lookup and Update. e Lookup API provides a remote service whereby URLs to be checked are sent to Google's servers and a response is returned for each URL stating if the URL is in the blacklist. e Update API provides the user with a local copy of the blacklist, this local copy is stored as a database of SHA-256 URL hash pre xes, the majority of the hash pre xes being 4 bytes. To perform a URL blacklist lookup, the URL hash pre x is checked in the local database and, if there is a pre x match, then the full URL hash is retrieved from Google's servers to determine if there is a match on the full hash.
Open Phish: Open Phish launched in 2014 and is the result of a 3 year research project on phishing detection that uses autonomous algorithms to detect zero day phishing websites. Our study has access to the academic feed. Open Phish is used by the antivirus companies Virus Total and Strong Arm. e Open Phish blacklist can be downloaded as a JSON le which typically contains around 5,000 unique URLs.
Phish Tank: Phish Tank launched in October 2006 and provides a community-based phishing website reporting and veri cation system. Users of the website can submit URLs of suspected phishing websites; the Phish Tank community then vote as to whether these URLs are phishing or not. Phish Tank is used by the web browser Opera, online reputation and internet safety service web browser plugin Web Of Trust, email provider Yahoo! Mail, and antivirus providers McAfee and Kaspersky [28] . e Phish Tank blacklist of approved phishing URLs can be downloaded as a JSON le and typically contains around 23,000 unique URLs.
Related Work
Existing literature has explored the e ectiveness of malware blacklists [18, 19] and also phishing a acks in areas such as why they work [7] , the e ectiveness of toolbars in protecting users [42, 43] , detection of phishing websites [44] , the e ectiveness of web browser warnings [8] , demographic analysis of phishing susceptibility and e ectiveness of interventions [31] , and a study to determine a baseline for phishing campaign success [17] . ere are also various techniques to prevent phishing a acks including Dynamic Security Skins [6] , Trusted Devices [27] along with educational aspects of phishing training including PhishGuru [20] and the game Anti-Phishing Phil [32] ; the e ectiveness of these two educational approaches were analysed [21] . Previous studies have also developed techniques to detect spam, phishing and malware on Twi er, such as looking at redirection chains to detect suspicious URLs [22] , analysing suspended accounts [36] , and using social graph models [40] . Phishers that use URL shortening services to masquerade phishing URLs on Twi er have also been studied [5] . 2 Catch Me (On Time) If You Can: Understanding the E ectiveness of Twi er URL Blacklists
Two key studies, carried out in 2007 [23] and 2009 [33] focused on phishing blacklists and how e ective they are at protecting users from phishing email a acks, paying particular a ention to the delay from an email containing a phishing URL being received to that URL appearing in a blacklist. We focus on Twi er as a delivery platform rather than e-mail.
Whilst these previous studies have looked at the phishing landscape in terms of detecting and preventing phishing a acks, they have not focused speci cally on the relationship between blacklists and phishing and malware a acks on Twi er. However, in a 2010 study, Grier et al. [15] characterised phishing, malware and scam URLs posted to Twi er. As part of their broad study, of which their overall aim was to characterise spam on Twi er, they analysed blacklist performance, looking at the blacklists GSB, Joewein, and URIBL. One of their main ndings was that malicious URLs either appeared in the GSB blacklist, on average, 29.58 days before being tweeted or, if the URLs were not blacklisted at time of tweeting, it took, on average, 24.9 days for the GSB blacklist to detect the URLs. Phishing URLs either appeared in the GSB blacklist, on average 2.57 days before being tweeted, or, if not in the blacklist at time of tweet, an average of 9.01 days a er tweeting.
Whilst the Grier et al. study looked at the delay for tweeted URLs to appear in a blacklist, it treated multiple tweets of the same URL as being unique, independent events. We take a di erent approach. We focus on the delay time between when a blacklisted URL is rst tweeted to when it rst appears in a blacklist such as GSB. We believe this provides a more accurate measurement to ascertain the e ectiveness of Twi er URL blacklisting. is is because it enables us to determine how long users are exposed to a speci c a ack URL since it was rst posted to Twi er. One of the main problems with the methodology in [15] is that a URL may be tweeted at a certain point in time, then tweeted again on multiple occasions at much later dates, closer to the point at which that URL becomes blacklisted. is then skews the results because the average delay time for that URL to become blacklisted, when calculated using all tweet times containing that URL, will appear to be smaller than the time of rst tweet to blacklist delay. is will tend to underestimate the exposure of users.
A missing detail from [15] is how the historical blacklist data from GSB was obtained. Our study uses timestamps of when URL hash pre xes were downloaded into our local copy of GSB to determine when a URL rst appeared in the GSB blacklist. Grier et al. [15] were also not speci c about which version of Twi er's Stream API they use, other than mentioning that it is a 10% feed. It is important to note that a 10% feed in 2010 will have produced approximately 3.5 million tweets per day -similar to the 3 million tweets per day that we collect in our study. e methodology section of our paper explains what version of Twi er's Stream API we used, in an e ort to improve the reproducibility of our study.
It is important to note that the aim of [15] was to characterise spam on Twi er, looking at phishing, malware, and scams; that study touched on blacklist performance as part of an overall, broad analysis of spam on Twi er. In contrast, our paper aims to assess how e ective Twi er's use of blacklists are at protecting its users from phishing and malware a acks. In contrast, we carry out a more ne-grained and in-depth study into the e ectiveness of blacklists on Twi er, particularly focusing on delay periods. As well as replicating the relevant experiments from [15] , we also introduce a new methodology to measure the delay between when a blacklisted URL is rst tweeted to when it rst appears in a blacklist. We also add the Phish Tank and Open Phish phishing blacklists to our study. Finally, and importantly, we check redirection chains for each tweeted URL, since blacklisted URLs may be hidden in such chains.
DESIGN 3.1 Overview
e infrastructure used to carry out experiments for our study consists of a tweet collection system that receives both sample tweets and also tweets containing URLs from Twi er; a database to store these collected tweets; a URL redirection chain extractor; a blacklist system to store, update and perform lookups against 3 popular blacklists; a database to store tweeted URLs which have appeared in a blacklist; a Twi er search API lookup system to determine when tweeted URLs rst appeared on Twi er; and a measurement system to calculate delays from URLs being tweeted to appearing in blacklists. e overall architecture of this system can be seen in Figure 1 
Data Collection
e rst requirement for our study is a source of live tweets from Twi er. To achieve this we setup two sources of incoming tweet feeds using Twi er's Stream API. e rst stream is, approximately, a 1% sample of all global tweets and the second stream is, approximately, a 1% sample of all global tweets that contain one or more URLs. e rst stream is used to provide a general picture of Twi er activity during collection and the second stream is used to carry out our blacklist delay analysis by looking up the tweeted URLs in various blacklists. Both of these tweet streams are saved locally in a database. e second requirement for our study is a way to store and search various blacklists. For our study 3 blacklists are used: GSB, Open Phish, and Phish Tank. e GSB blacklist includes both social engineering and malicious URLs. Our system regularly obtains the latest copies of these blacklists and saves them locally in a database on our system. Tweeted URLs from our collection of tweets can then be searched for in these 3 blacklists. 3
Methodology
As described in the previous subsection, tweets containing URLs are collected from the Twi er stream and saved into a local database. 3 blacklists are also stored in the local database. In order to determine which tweeted URLs appear in the 3 blacklists two systems are used: fast and slow. e fast system checks the 3 million most recently tweeted URLs (equivalent to about 24 hours of tweets) against the GSB blacklist every 10 minutes and the Open Phish and Phish Tank blacklists every hour. We determined this 10 minute update frequency by carrying out a small-scale study to observe how frequently the GSB Update API blacklist updates. Open Phish and Phish Tank refresh their blacklists every 60 minutes. e slow system checks all tweeted URLs we have collected since our experiment began and performs a lookup on the latest versions of all 3 blacklists. is slow lookup system will complete its cycle of all URLs relatively quickly at rst but increase in duration as the number of URLs in the experiment grow. e main slowdown in this lookup system is that the GSB API requires any hash pre x match to be sent to GSB's servers for the full hash to be downloaded then checked for a match. is system is necessarily slower in its operation, taking a number of hours to complete a pass over our full collection of tweets. e reason for these two lookup systems (fast and slow) is because GSB does not include a "time of inclusion" for blacklisted URLs. is system helps us to determine when URLs appear in the GSB blacklist, with ner resolution on URLs that are tweeted within 24 hours. e outcome is that we can produce more accurate results in our measurements.
During the experiment it was discovered that the library implementation we use for GSB's Update API also stores timestamps for when blacklisted URL hash pre xes were added to the local database. We then built a system to lookup each blacklisted URL's hash pre x timestamp to determine when each URL was added to our local copy of the blacklist. e GSB Update API library stores each blacklisted URL as a 4-byte SHA256 hash pre x; due to the small size of these URL hash pre xes, there is a chance that collisions may occur. Because of this, only hash pre x lookups that had zero collisions were used for the experimental results.
is additional system complements the previously mentioned fast and slow lookup systems because the new system will produce more accurate results for when a URL is already in GSB -particularly if a URL has been in GSB for a signi cant amount of time. e fast and slow systems are still required for when tweeted URLs are not in GSB at time of tweet.
For a tweeted URL, there could be a number of hops or redirections that are made before arriving at the nal landing page. For this reason a redirection chain extractor is used to check each URL contained within in a redirection chain against each of the blacklists. e technicalities of this redirection chain extractor system are explained in more detail in the implementation section.
When calculating the time from a tweet appearing in the Twi er Stream feed to appearing in one of the 3 de ned blacklists, some tweeted URLs may have previously appeared on Twi er prior to being received in the Twi er Stream feed. To compensate for this, we carry out another experiment. In this experiment, when computing delays from time of tweet to time of blacklist appearance, we built a system to lookup each blacklisted URL in Twi er's Search API.
Our system can determine when the URL was rst tweeted; this timestamp can then be used to calculate the delay between rst tweet and rst blacklist appearance, therefore increasing the accuracy of the measurement. Limitations of using this approach, as stated in Twi er's Search API documentation, are that it is limited to 7-10 days, it is not an exhaustive source of tweet. erefore not all tweets will be indexed or made available via the search interface.
Overview of Experiments
Our rst experiment analyses tweets collected from Twi er's Stream API with the sample method; these sample tweets are collected during the same time frame as the URL-containing tweets. is experiment shows us the ratio of URL containing to non-URL containing tweets along with a breakdown of the numbers of tweets received per day.
Our second experiment replicates one of the experiments carried out by Grier et al. [15] in which the delay from a URL being tweeted to appearing in the blacklists is calculated. is experiment shows what has changed since the 2010 study -particularly since Twi er's active user base has grown from 30 million in 2010 to over 330 million in 2017 and total number of daily tweets has grown from 35 million in 2010 to over 500 million in 2017.
Our third experiment uses a di erent methodology to the 2010 study [15] , in that we use the timestamp for when a blacklisted URL was rst tweeted to calculate delay to rst appearing in a blacklist. If a URL is tweeted multiple times then only the rst tweet to contain that URL will be used to calculate delay. is measurement is important as it allows us to determine how long it takes for URLs to appear in blacklists a er they are rst tweeted. is experiment also includes the Phish Tank and Open Phish databases.
Our fourth experiment is an improvement on the previous experiment in that the Twi er Search API system is used to determine when a URL was rst tweeted. Within Twi er's Search API limit, of 180 calls per 15 minute window, URLs that appear in blacklists are searched for on Twi er to determine their original tweet date.
is allows us to determine, with more accuracy than the previous experiment, when a URL was rst tweeted (i.e. if we did not receive the original tweet containing a given URL in our Twi er Stream).
is also provides us with the worst case scenario measurement. Our h experiment analyses for how long blacklisted tweeted URLs remain in the GSB blacklist for. In order to carry out this experiment the timestamp for when a URL rst appears in the Twi er Filter (URL) Stream is compared against the last time the system matched the same URL in the GSB blacklist. e di erence between these two timestamps is used as the measurement.
IMPLEMENTATION
Our entire system is implemented on a virtual machine running the Ubuntu operating system, version 16.04 LTS, 8 core CPU, 24 GB RAM. e measurement framework is wri en in the programming language Python.
Our Twi er collection system uses Twi er's Stream API, implemented via the Tweepy [37] library. A er authorising Tweepy to access Twi er, the sample() and lter() methods are used to collect sample and URL containing tweets. e lter method uses keywords "h p" and "h ps" to lter out tweets containing URLs. All data received from Twi er's Stream API, using these two methods, is stored in a MySQL [26] version 5.7.19-0ubuntu0. 16 .04.1 database in two tables for sample tweets and URL-containing tweets, respectively. e URL redirection chain extraction system uses Python's Requests library [30] to send a HTTP request for each URL using a Macintosh Safari user agent header so the request appears to come from a regular user via the Safari web browser. e reason for se ing this header is so the request extracts the same redirection chain that a legitimate user would see and not a redirection chain that a bot would see -therefore reducing bias in our results. e Request library's Response object contains a History property which consists of a list of Response objects that were created to complete the HTTP request. is list is then used to extract the redirection chain for a given URL in our system.
We use 3 blacklists in our system: GSB, Open Phish and Phish Tank. To implement our GSB lookup system, the library gglsbl [10] version 1.0.0 is used. is library allows our system to fetch the latest GSB hash pre xes and also perform lookups against the database.
e library uses the SQLite [34] database for storing GSB data. e library contains a method update hash pre x cache() which is used to update the URL hash pre x database. is method is called every 10 minutes in the fast GSB lookup system and at the beginning of each cycle of the slow GSB lookup system.
An important modi cation was made to the gglsbl library to improve lookup times for large numbers of URLs. e method lookup url() is used to lookup an individual URL in the local hash pre x database. It does this by performing an SQLite search for that URL's hash pre x. is lookup technique caused a bo leneck when testing the system on large volumes of URLs, therefore the library was modi ed to output a Python dictionary (hash table) of all URL hash pre xes. Our system can then perform a lookup for each tweeted URL's hash pre x against this dictionary. Since the Python dictionary implementation uses a hash map, the typical time complexity for this lookup is constant; O(1). is means lookups are considerably faster than using the o -the-shelf version of the GSB library.
During our experiment, we observe that the GSB blacklist typically contains approximately 4.8 million URL hash pre xes of which approximately 3.1 million are unique. Of these, there are approximately 1 million unique URL hash pre xes labelled malware and approximately 1.8 million unique URL hash pre xes labelled social engineering. e remaining URL hash pre xes labels are not used in our study.
Both the Phish Tank and Open Phish datasets are download as JSON les from their websites. e URL entries from these les are then extracted and saved into our local MySQL database. Metadata stored along with URLs includes discovery timestamps from the blacklists and timestamps for when URLs were added to our database. Both datasets are downloaded every hour and new entries saved in the local database. URL lookups against these two databases are completed by importing all URLs from both databases and storing them in a Python dictionary in order to perform faster lookups, as per our GSB lookup implementation.
Our Twi er Search API lookup system uses the Tweepy library to interact with Twi er's Search API. A er authorising Tweepy to access Twi er, the Search method is used to search for a given URL. is method will return the oldest tweet in Twi er's search history, that contains a given URL string, if it can be found. Figure 2 shows the per-day total number of Twi er Sample Stream tweets, including URL and non-URL containing tweets, along with total number of Twi er Filter (URL) Stream tweets collected in October and November 2017. ere are 10,029 unique URLs that rst appeared in the Twi er Stream Filter (URL) in either October or November that subsequently appeared in one of the GSB, Open Phish or Phish Tank blacklists at some point during our experiments. Of these URLs, 5,464 appeared in one of the blacklists within 1 month before or a er rst appearing in the Twi er Filter (URL) Stream, as seen in Table 2 . It is interesting to note that only 9 URLs from Open Phish and Phish Tank appeared in the Twi er Filter (URL) stream during the October and November timeframe. In October, of the 2 Open Phish URLs that were tweeted, 1 had been added to the Open Phish blacklist on the 22nd August 2017 and the other had a delay of 12 days from date rst tweeted to appearing in the blacklist. Of the 2 Phish Tank URLs from October: one had been tweeted on the 15th October 2017, but was blacklisted by Open Phish on 1st September 2017, the other was blacklisted approximately 5 minutes a er being tweeted. For November: the 1 Open Phish URL appeared in the blacklist approximately 5 minutes a er being tweeted. For the 4 Phish Tank URLs, blacklist delays were approximately 32 minutes, 35 minutes, 21 days and 9 days a er tweet. Considerably fewer tweeted URLs appeared in the Open Phish and Phish Tank blacklists compared to GSB. One reason for this di erence may be that the GSB blacklist contains approximately 3 million URLs whereas the Phish Tank and Open Phish blacklists contain 28,000 URLs combined; there are fewer URLs for Phish Tank and Open Phish to detect. Another possibility is that Twi er is using the Phish Tank and Open Phish blacklists and therefore preventing users from tweeting URLs contained within these blacklists. However, if that were the case, then we would still see URLs in the Twi er Stream before they appear in the Open Phish or Phish Tank blacklists. Figures 3a and 3b show the total number of unique URLs per day that rst appeared in the Twi er Filter (URL) Stream in the given month that subsequently rst appeared in the GSB Blacklist, as either social engineering or malware, within 1 month before or a er appearing in the Twi er Filter (URL) Stream for October and November 2017.
RESULTS

Twitter Dataset Analysis
Findings: ese results show that we collected, approximately, 3.4M sample and 3M URL-containing tweets per day throughout October and November 2017. Of these, 5,464 unique URLs appeared in one of the 3 blacklists within 1 month before or a er rst appearing in the Twi er Stream Filter (URL). is volume of tweets provides us with a good amount of data to explore delay times, click metrics, and overall time in GSB in the upcoming sections.
We also see there are only 9 URLs from the Open Phish and Phish Tank blacklists. is may possibly be because the Phish Tank and Open Phish blacklists contain fewer URLs (approximately 28,000) compared to GSB (approximately 3 million). 
Blacklist Delays -All Blacklisted Tweets
In this subsection we replicate one of the experiments carried out in 2010 by Grier et al. [15] . It is important to note that it is di cult to replicate their study exactly because their methodology is not completely explained in their paper. Speci cally, they do not explain how a historical copy of the GSB blacklist is acquired or if they allow a delay period of 1 month before and a er every URL is tweeted. To the best of our knowledge, based on their paper, this is a replication of one of the experiments in their study.
In this experiment the delay period for a tweeted URL to appear in the GSB blacklist is calculated using time of tweet to time rst appearing in blacklist. If a URL is tweeted multiple times then each posting is treated as a unique, independent event. is is the same methodology used by [15] . In our results a negative delay value represents a URL that appears in the blacklist before it is tweeted and a positive delay value represents a URL that appears in the blacklist a er being tweeted. is is because we are measuring the delay from a URL being tweeted to rst appearing in a blacklist, so a delay value of 20 days means it took 20 days from that URL being tweeted to appearing in a blacklist. e Grier et al. [15] study uses lead and lag times in their measurements, where a lead time signi es a URL that appears on Twi er before being blacklisted and a lag time is used to denote a URL that appears in a blacklist a er being tweeted. As a result, their lead times are positive and lag times are negative values.
Our rst experiment looks at URLs that were tweeted during October and November 2017 which were subsequently labelled as social engineering in the GSB blacklist within 1 month before or a er being tweeted. We believe this is the most accurate way to carry out this measurement since the same timeframe is applied to all individual tweets, regardless of when they were tweeted in the month. is methodology is not de ned in [15] so it may a ect the comparison. Timestamps for when tweets are received from the Twi er Filter (URL) Stream are used as tweet date and URL hash 6 pre x timestamps from the GSB blacklist library are used to determine time rst appeared in GSB blacklist to calculate total delay from tweet to blacklist, as described in the methodology section of this paper. During this experiment a total of 7,597 tweets containing social engineering URLs in the GSB blacklist were recorded in October and 5,193 in November, as seen in Figures 4a and 4b . We then carry out the same experiment for malware URLs: a total of 1,110 tweets containing malware URLs embedded the GSB blacklist were recorded in October and 914 in November, as seen in Figures 4c  and 4d . An additional step we take in our experiments, which was not carried out in [15] , is to further investigate anomalies in these results and to also clean the results by removing the most frequent domain names. is is explained further in the next subsection. For tweets containing blacklisted social engineering URLs In October there is a spike of tweets at -8 days and again between -2 and -4 days. ese spikes are caused by one domain name. For tweets containing blacklisted social engineering URLs in November, there is a peak of 3,316 tweets that have a delay time of between 13 and 14 days, as seen in gure 4b. is spike is caused by one domain name.
When comparing our results to the 2010 study [15] it is important to remember that their study had access to a 10% Twi er feed of approximately 35 million tweets per day in 2010; our 2017 study collects approximately 3 million URL-containing tweets per daycomparable numbers. e rst noticeable di erence is that there are a greater number of overall tweets containing blacklisted social engineering URLs in our study. Whereas [15] sees a greater number of tweets containing malware URLs appear in GSB a er they have been tweeted. We see signi cantly more tweets containing blacklisted URLs appearing on Twi er a er they have appeared in the GSB blacklist for both social engineering and malware URLs. In our study, for social engineering tweets in November, the delay with the greatest number of tweets is 13.5 days with approximately 3,275 tweets. In [15] , the delay with the greatest number of tweets approximately -6 days with approximately 58 tweets. In our study, when looking at social engineering tweets in October, the delay with the greatest number of tweets is 26 days with 790 tweets. is shows that, in our results, there is a greater volume of social engineering tweets appearing on Twi er. e results in [15] show that the average lag time for social engineering tweets is 9.01 days and the average lead period is -2.57 days. For malware tweets the average lag time is 24.90 days and the average lead time is -29.58 days. e results for the average lead and lag times for our experiments can be seen in Table 3 . ese gures show that the lag time averages can vary depending on if the most frequent domain names are included in the calculation, as is the case for social engineering and malware tweets in October.
Findings:
One of the most signi cant di erences between our results and those in 2010 [15] is that, in our results, there are substantially more URLs being posted to Twi er a er they appear in the GSB blacklist, compared to [15] . is suggests that Twi er has altered its ltering process to allow some URLs blacklisted by GSB to be tweeted or they may have stopped using the GSB blacklist altogether and built their own URL ltering system. GSB Table 3 : Average delay times for all tweeted blacklisted social engineering (SE) and malware URL delays. Lead and lag times indicate appearing in blacklist before or a er being tweeted, respectively.
Blacklist Delays -From Time of First Tweet
In this subsection we use a di erent methodology to [15] in that the timestamp for when a blacklisted URL was rst tweeted is used to calculate delay to rst appearing in a blacklist. is new methodology is important as it allows us to determine how long it takes for URLs to appear in blacklists a er they are rst tweetedtherefore calculating how long users are exposed to a acks for. If a URL is tweeted multiple times then only the rst tweet to contain that URL will be used to calculate delay. One of the main problems with the measurement carried out in [15] is that a URL may be tweeted at a certain point in time, then tweeted again on multiple occasions at a much later point in time; closer to the point at which that URL becomes blacklisted. is then skews the results because, in this example, the average delay time for that URL to become blacklisted, when calculated from all tweet times containing that URL, will be less when compared to just the time of rst tweet to blacklist delay. In this experiment we look at unique URLs that were rst tweeted during October and November 2017 which were subsequently labelled as social engineering in the GSB blacklist within 1 month before or a er being tweeted. Timestamps for when tweets were received from the Twi er Filter (URL) Stream are used as the tweet date and URL hash pre x timestamps from the GSB blacklist library are used to determine time rst appeared in GSB blacklist to calculate total delay from tweet to blacklist, as described in the methodology section. During this experiment a total of 3,273 unique social engineering URLs were recorded in October and 930 in November.
During October the majority of social engineering URLs saw a delay period of approximately 18 to 26 days from being tweeted to appearing in the GSB blacklist. Upon further investigation it was discovered that 7 domain names accounted for 76% of the total dataset, 2,487 URLs, as shown in Table 4 . All of the URLs contained within this dataset are HTTP; none of them are HTTPS. shows that the majority of URLs appeared in the GSB blacklist within 6 hours of being tweeted, as seen, a er being zoomed in to 24 hours, in Figure 6a . A similar pa ern is also seen in November where there is a peak at around 6 hours, as seen in Figure 6b , although still a high number of URLs are blacklisted between 6 and 24 hours. Figures 5a-5d and 6a-6b show the delay period between tweet and blacklist, with the number of unique URLs on the y axis and delay period along the x axis. A delay period greater than zero means that the URL appeared in the GSB blacklist a er it appeared on Twi er. A delay of less than zero means that it was already in the GSB blacklist at time of Tweet. e negative delay values, in these graphs, show that large numbers of URLs were tweeted a er they appeared in the GSB blacklist. As with the previous subsection, this further suggests that Twi er are either not using the GSB blacklist or are allowing some URLs in GSB to be tweeted. is means that Twi er users are exposed to social engineering and malware a acks.
In terms of the impact of these tweets, looking at just the top 7 most frequent domains that were rst tweeted in October 2017 and appeared in GSB within 1 month before or a er being tweeted, these 2,487 unique URLs were tweeted by 1,227 individual Twitter accounts, making up 4,930 total tweets. ese 1,227 Twi er accounts have a combined number of 131,116,820 followers giving a sense of the total number of Twi er users potentially exposed to these social engineering tweets. Figure 7a shows the distribution of these top 7 domains names in the dataset showing that Domains 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 appear predominantly towards the 16 to 30 day delay mark with a few outliers around the 14 to 16 day mark, the majority of Domain 4 spans from -5 to 26 days and Domain 7 stays around the 25 to 31 day mark.
When comparing the most frequently tweeted domains that are agged as social engineering in GSB in October and November there are 4 domains names that appear in both months. is shows that, during the two months in which we collected data from Twi er and GSB, there were a number of large campaigns that spanned across both of these months. One of these domain names is in the Alexa top 100, suggesting that this website had become compromised, potentially by some sort of social engineering advert. One theory .cn 582 3
.com 554 4
.com 273 5
.cn 203 6
.cn 188 7
.life 73 Table 4 : October 2017 seven most frequent social engineering domains tweeted (domain names redacted).
as to why Twi er continues to allow URLs from this domain, and others like it, to be tweeted on its network is because the main web browsers (such as Chrome, Safari, Firefox etc.) have built-in protection -which should prevent users from visiting dangerous websites. Twi er can then outsource the protection of its users to the web browsers. is is also the case on both the Android and iOS Twi er apps whereby links are scanned by the Chrome and Safari web browser blacklists. One of the main weaknesses to this approach is that there may be an a ack space when web browsers update their blacklists. If a user visits a newly blacklisted website, but their web browser has not updated their local copy of the blacklist, then the user will be allowed to visit the dangerous website without any warnings -exposing them to the a ack.
When analysing the target of the social engineering campaign tweets in October many of the tweets appear to be using click-bait techniques. ese tweets o en use misleading titles to promote, for example, health techniques with li le evidence to backup their claims. Examples of tweets seen in our dataset include " is Is What Happens When You Press is Point Near Your Ear For One Minute" and " is Leaking From Your Eye Can Be a Sign of a Dangerous Eye Infection". ese click-bait techniques are commonly used to a ract large numbers of people to a website in order to generate revenue from adverts.
We then repeat the experiment, only this time analysing all tweeted malware URLs, as classi ed by GSB. A total of 718 unique malware URLs were recorded during the same timeframe in October 2017 and 543 unique malware URLs in November 2017. When looking at the frequency distribution of delays, the largest peak of GSB blacklisted malware URLs in October occurs at approximately 25 days and was caused by 2 domain names (consisting of 219 and 161 URLs) making up 39% of the October dataset of 718 URLs. e total number of tweeted Malware URLs in October can be seen in Figure 5c and shows frequency distribution for the month including the 2 outlying domain names. Figure 7b shows the distribution of these top 2 domain names in the dataset, showing that Domain 1 mostly covered days 5 to 25, with its median at approximately 19.5 days. Domain 2 is predominantly spread over the -20 to 12 day delay period, with its median being just over 0 days. Finally, in November 2017, the largest peak appears at around 14 days and is caused by 1 outlying domain name (consisting of 140 URLs) which made up 26% of the dataset. e frequency distribution for November can be seen in Figure 5d . Figure 8 shows a boxplot of tweeted GSB blacklisted social engineering and malware URL delays in October and November 2017. e rst row shows the distribution of social engineering URLs in October 2017, before the top 7 domains were removed whilst the second row shows the same timeframe but with the top 7 domains removed. Row three shows GSB blacklisted social engineering URLs in November, row four shows malware URLs in October and row ve shows malware URLs in November 2017. is shows that, for social engineering URLs, the median delay time was around 7 days in October and just over 0 days in November. For malware URLs the median delay was around 11 days in October and around 8.5 days in November.
ese graphs show that GSB appears to be quicker at detecting social engineering websites than malware websites. One reason for this may be that the criteria for the social engineering ag may include a wider net. erefore, as we saw with the Alexa top 100 domain, some high tra c websites may become blacklisted when they fall into this net. Whereas agging a website in the malware blacklist requires Google to be certain the website is harming -or 9 a empting to harm -the user's computer in some way. is potentially stricter classi cation may take more time to con rm and may explain why malware is slower to detect than social engineering in our results.
Findings: One of the key takeaways from these experiments is that Twi er allow considerably more URLs to be tweeted a er appearing in the GSB blacklist, compared to the 2010 study [15] . As previously mentioned, this may be because Twi er is relying more on web browsers' built-in protection from malware and phishing URLs. However, one of the biggest weaknesses to this approach is that the built-in blacklists used by web browsers take time to update and this creates an a ack space. e results in this section also show there is a signi cant delay -20 to 30 days in some cases -before URLs are blacklisted. We also see where a combined total of 131,116,820 Twi er users are exposed to 2,487 unique blacklisted URLs. is means Twi er users are exposed to these dangerous a acks for a substantial amount of time.
Even though the experiments in this subsection do not identify absolute earliest time of tweet, our delay measurement will always be an underestimate. erefore the real situation, in terms of Twi er users being exposed to dangerous URLs due to blacklist delay times, is much worse. is methodological weakness is addressed in the next subsection.
Blacklist Delays -Twitter Search API
e experiments in this subsection aim to further improve the accuracy of the experiments carried out in the previous subsection. We do this by making use of Twi er's Search API to determine the original tweet date for blacklisted URLs. Also, because we use Twi er's 1% feed of tweets there may be instances where a URL appears outside of our Twi er Stream. By using Twi er's Search API we can determine when a given URL was tweeted. e measurements taken in this experiment are the same as in the previous subsection, that is the delay between a blacklisted URL rst being tweeted and rst appearing in the GSB blacklist within 1 month before of a er tweet date, only in this section each URL is searched for on Twi er and the timestamp of that search result is used for the delay calculation. Using this method, in October 2017, 295 social engineering and 230 malware URLs are recorded; their delays can be seen in Figures 9a and 9c . In November 2017, 284 social engineering and 131 malware URLs are recorded and can be seen in Figures 9b and 9d .
It is important to note that there are signi cantly fewer URLs in this part of the dataset. is is because Twi er states that its Search API is not a complete search, therefore some URLs we try to determine original tweet timestamps for cannot be found. In this case these URLs are dropped from the dataset. A clear pa ern that emerges in all 4 of these graphs is that there are no URLs with a delay from rst tweet to rst blacklist of more than 10 days. is is because Twi er's Search API is limited to 7-10 days; any URLs the system searches for that appeared in the GSB blacklist more than 7-10 days a er being tweeted will not show up in a Twi er search if the URL has not been tweeted again since.
is limits these graphs, since they show a reduced picture of delays between URLs being tweeted and appearing in the GSB blacklist. However, as seen in the previous two sections, there are still high numbers of URLs already in the GSB blacklist at time of tweet.
Findings: Measurements in the previous subsection do not show the worst-case scenario in terms of delay from rst tweet to appearing in blacklist because URLs may have been previously tweeted. However, results in this section, whilst showing fewer URLs in the dataset, do show the worst case scenario for delay from rst tweet to blacklist membership. is adds additional evidence that Twi er are not blocking all GSB URLs and may to be relying on other, possibly third-party techniques, to protect its users against a acks.
ere is also a signi cant number of URLs that take between 0 and 10 days to appear in the GSB blacklist -meaning users are exposed to social engineering and malware a acks during these delay periods.
Blacklisted URL Clicks
To explore the impact of tweets that contain blacklisted URLs, we lookup Bitly URLs that either directly appear in or are embedded in the redirection chain that leads to the GSB blacklist, in our dataset. Bitly [3] is a URL shortening service that also provide public analytics for URL clicks, referrers, and location, via an API. By extracting Bitly links from our dataset of tweeted URLs that subsequently appear in the GSB blacklist, we can then use the Bitly API to lookup how many clicks each URL received. Table 5 shows, from our dataset of tweeted URLs that subsequently appeared in the GSB blacklist, the total number of unique 10 To investigate the impact of tweeting a blacklisted URL to a Twi er account with a high number of followers, we extracted a blacklisted URL, from our dataset, that uses Bitly. e blacklisted Bitly URL was tweeted by an account with 3.7 million followers on October 24 and agged as social engineering in GSB on November 11. e URL received 276 clicks during the week of October 22 2017, of which 270 came from Twi er. 176 of these clicks came from the USA, 19 from Canada, 12 from the UK and the remaining 34 from elsewhere. is URL did not receive any more clicks a er the week of October 22 at which point it appears to have been blocked by Bitly. is example shows that a single tweet, from a high follower account, posting a dangerous URL, can receive a high number of global clicks -therefore exposing a large amount of Twi er users to the a ack. It also shows that GSB took 18 days to add the URL to its blacklist, while Bitly appears to have blocked the URL much sooner. In this scenario, Twi er appears to have outsourced its lter to Bitly -relying on Bitly to protect Twi er's own users.
Findings: ese results show that, in one month alone, 1,052,152 clicks were exposed to dangerous malware and social engineering a acks due to Twi er not blocking these harmful URLs. ese click metrics represent 11% of our dataset, which is, approximately, 1% of all global tweets on Twi er -giving a sense of the scale and impact caused by Twi er allowing blacklisted URLs to appear on their social network.
Posting Blacklisted URLs to Twitter
In a separate experiment we created a private account on Twi er whereby the account's tweets were not publicly visible. We then a empted to tweet a sample of 30 blacklisted URLs: 10 from GSB, 10 from Open Phish and 10 from Phish Tank. In this experiment, 8 of the Open Phish URLs and 9 of the Phish Tank URLs could not be posted to Twi er. All of the GSB URLs were posted successfully to Twi er. For tweets containing blacklisted URLs that could not be posted to Twi er this error message was displayed: " is request looks like it might be automated. To protect our users from spam and other malicious activity, we can't complete this action right now. Please try again later". We were able to tweet messages that did not contain blacklisted URLs without receiving this error message.
is suggests that Twi er may display this generic error message when URLs that it has ltered are requested to be tweeted on the social network. It is important to note that this was a small-scale study and that the Twi er account used for this experiment was set to private, therefore all tweets were hidden from the public. Public Twi er accounts may see di erent results in this experiment -for example: public tweets may go through a stricter ltering process. Due to ethical considerations, we did not post any public tweets containing blacklisted URLs.
Findings: e outcome of this experiment shows that Twi er appears to be blocking more URLs on the Phish Tank and Open Phish blacklists compared to GSB. Providing further evidence that Twi er is not using the GSB blacklist -therefore exposing users to dangerous URLs.
URL Time in GSB
is section explores the duration of time that unique URLs remained in the GSB blacklist for. Each experiment takes all unique URLs that were rst tweeted in a given month, then, if a URL is not in GSB at time of tweet, the duration in GSB is calculated as when the system rst detects the URL in GSB to when the system last saw the same URL in GSB. If a URL is already in GSB at time of tweet then the GSB library URL hash pre x timestamp is used as time rst blacklisted and the time our system last saw the URL in GSB as the nal timestamp. e di erence between these timestamps is used to calculate total time in GSB for each URL. ese duration periods are then plo ed on histograms to show the frequency of di erent duration in GSB for all URLs. Figures 10a and 10b show the duration of time that social engineering URLs spent in the GSB blacklist in October and November 2017 and Figures 10c and 10d show the duration of time malware URLs appeared in the GSB blacklist in October and November 2017. All four of these graphs have a logarithmic scale on the y axis so both high and low numbers are illustrated clearly.
Findings: One of the main conclusions from these graphs is that there is a general downward trend. is shows that, over time, the number of URLs in the GSB blacklist is reducing. is means that URLs are removed from the blacklist, presumably once they are no-longer a threat. Our experiment ran for 150 days and there were over 1,000 URLs remaining in the blacklist, for each category, at the end of the experiment -meaning that many URLs remained in the GSB blacklist for at least 150 days. Some of these URLs may 11 still be dangerous, however, there may be false positives in this blacklist which would mean these URLs are, unnecessarily, being blocked. Exploring long-term false positives in GSB is something we may explore in future work.
DISCUSSION 6.1 Limitations
Twi er's Search API is limited to 7-10 days and is not a complete search, therefore the resulting dataset in Section 5.4 is reduced. Despite this, the methodology increases accuracy of both the dataset and results in Section 5.3. ereby producing the worst case scenario result, from the perspective of users, when calculating delay from rst tweet to rst appearing in blacklist. Twi er's approximately 1% data stream provides a reduced dataset, therefore limiting the determination of original URL tweet timestamps (i.e. if a URL is tweeted outside the data stream). We compensate as much as possible for this by using techniques such as Twi er's Search API to determine rst tweet timestamps.
Our study may capture benign websites that became compromised. In future work we may explore compromised websites further, for example, by analysing percentage of compromised versus a ack websites in our results (using GSB's terminology).
GSB uses path pre x expansion; iteratively trying broader and broader URLs (e.g., x.y.z/a/b/c, x.y.z/a/, x.y.z, y.z). is could result in newly blacklisted hosts, from fresh incidents, being misinterpreted as missed historical URLs. Potential mitigation could involve GSB library modi cation to ag if entire domains become blacklisted. Results could then exclude blacklisted domains.
We do not detect tweets containing phishing or malicious URLs that never make it into GSB. erefore GSB is our "ground truth". We a empt to mitigate this by using the Open Phish and Phish Tank blacklists.
Twitter Filter Analysis
We have hypothesised that Twi er may have developed their own method to lter dangerous URLs from their network, to protect their users, and are no longer using the GSB blacklist. Whilst we could carry out experiments to analyse this further, we would essentially be "reverse engineering" Twi er's ltering process. It is hard to do this without violating Twi er's terms of use.
CONCLUSION
is paper examined how e ective URL blacklists are in protecting Twi er users against phishing and malware a acks. We analysed over 182 million URL-containing public tweets collected from Twi er's Stream API, over a 2 month period, and compared these URLs against 3 popular social engineering, phishing, and malware blacklists. Our main discovery was that, although the majority of phishing and malware URLs are detected by the GSB blacklist (which is used by popular web browsers) within 6 hours of being tweeted, there are still a large number of URLs that take at least 20 days to appear in GSB. We discovered 4,930 tweets containing URLs leading to social engineering websites that took between 18 and 30 days to appear in the blacklist. Between them, these 4,930 tweets had been tweeted to over 131 million Twi er users. We also discovered 1,126 tweets containing 376 blacklisted Bitly URLs that had received a combined total of 991,012 clicks. ese URLs represented 11% of the total blacklisted social engineering URLs in that month. e fact that the GSB blacklist can take weeks to detect dangerous URLs poses serious security risks to Twi er users: tweets containing blacklisted URLs are sent to large numbers of followers and receive a signi cant amount of clicks, thereby exposing users to dangerous websites. Conversely, and surprisingly to us, there are large numbers of URLs being tweeted that have already been blacklisted by GSB. is strongly indicates that Twi er is not using the GSB blacklist to block malicious tweets at the time of tweeting, contrary to what was once reported to be the case [24] . In summary, whilst blacklists are reasonably e ective at protecting Twi er users from phishing and malware a acks, there is still an unprotected space that leaves Twi er users vulnerable.
